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COMMENTS ON FOWLER v. WOODWARD
On September 14, 1964, the Supreme Court of South Carolina
in Fowler v. Woodward held that recovery would be allowed
under the Wrongful Death Statute for the death of an unborn,
viable infant. Because of the impact of this case on South
Carolina tort law, the Editors invited several attorneys and
law professors to comment upon the decision. These comments
follow a reprint of the official report.
Fowlerv . Woodward, - S.C. -, 138 S.E.0d 4 (1964)
BRAILSFORD, A. J.: This is an appeal from an order of the
circuit court overruling a demurrer to the complaint. The action
is for damages for the wrongful death of an unborn, viable
infant. The complaint alleges that the infant, while in the eighth
month of gestation, perished with its mother in an automobile
collision, and ensuing fire, which was caused by the negligent
and willful misconduct of the defendant. The demurrer is for
insufficiency of facts to state a cause of action and for lack of
legal capacity to sue, in that, the complaint fails to allege that
the infant "was born alive and thereafter died as a result of
the actions and injuries alleged and complained of."
The action is brought under the wrongful death statute, Sec-
tion 10-1951, et sequa, Code, 1962, and the controlling issue is
whether the facts alleged state a case for recovery under the
statute, which we quote:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrong-
ful act, neglect or default of another and the act, neglect or de-
fault is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages
in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable, if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages,
notwithstanding the death of the person injured * * * *21
until 1958, no case had come before this court involving pre-
natal injury as a ground of action, either for the benefit of the
child or for its wrongful death. Many cases had been decided
in this country, most of them, until comparatively recently,
following the view expressed by Mr. Justice Holmes in Dietrich
v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242,
that is "* * * * (A)s the unborn child was a part of the mother
at the time of the injury, any damage to it, which was not too
439
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remote to be recovered at all, was recoverable by her * * * *."
This rule, that injuries inflicted before birth could never sup-
port an action, was conducive of harsh results and has been
abandoned by most courts. The unborn child, certainly after
viability, is recognized as a distinct being capable of sustaining
a legal wrong. We need not review these developments in the
law, because that has been done in our own recent, 1960, case
of Hall v. Murphy, 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E. (2d) 790*; in which
a prenatal injury to a viable child resulted in her death, some
four hours after birth. We held that an action for the wrongful
death of the child would lie, and, also, an action for personal
injuries to the infant.
In the earlier, 1958, case of West v. McCoy, 233 S.C. 369, 105
S.E. (2d) 88, we denied recovery for the death of a non-viable
child, whose mother suffered a miscarriage as the result of in-
juries negligently inflicted upon her. The opinion in that case
recognized the departure of most courts from the old rule deny-
ing recovery for prenatal injuries regardless of circumstances,
but refused to go to the extent of allowing recovery for wrong-
ful death in the case of a non-viable, stillborn child.
Neither of these decisions is strictly controling of the issue
before us because of the factual differences which have been
stated. However, we think that the rationale of the Hall case, in
the light of the statute, clearly points to affirmance here.
An action for wrongful death will lie, under the terms of the
statute, when the death of a person is caused by the act, neglect
or default of another and the act is such as would, if death had
not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action.
The Hall case, supra, is plenary authority that a viable fetus,
"having reached that period of prenatal maturity where it is
capable of independent life apart from its mother is a person
and if such a child is injured, it may after birth maintain an
action for such injuries. * * * *
"Having concluded that had (the child) lived, she could have
maintained an action for any prenatal injury caused by de-
fendant's negligence, it follows that the two actions (personal
injury and wrongful death) now under consideration could be
brought by her administrator." (Interpolation ours.) 236 S.C.
263, 113 S.E. (2d) 793.
* See also the learned opinions in Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 220, 102 N.E.
(2d) 691, 27 A.L.R. (2d) 1250, and Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E. (2d)
412, and many others cited in Hall.
[Vol. 16
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Since a viable child is a person before separation from the
body of its mother and since prenatal injuries tortiously in-
flicted on such a child are actionable, it is apparent that the
complaint alleges such an "act, neglect or default" by the defend-
ant, to the injury of the child, as would have entitled the child
"to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof
* * * * if death had not ensued." By the very terms of the
statute, this is the test of the right of an administrator to main-
tain an action for wrongful death.
Some judges have taken the view that if a child should sur-
vive a prenatal injury, it could not, before birth, bring an action
for damages; therefore, it is urged, such a case does not meet
the requirement of the statute in this respect. We disagree.
Once the concept of the unborn, viable child as a person is
accepted, we have no difficulty in holding that a cause of action
for tortious injury to such a child arises immediately upon the
infliction of the injury. It is beside the point that the extent
of damages might be difficult, or even impossible, to establish
prior to birth. Indeed, the injurious consequences of a prenatal
injury might not become manifest until long after birth, but
this would not affect the existence of the cause of action from the
time of the wrong, nor the character of the wrongful act as one
entitling the child to recover damages therefor.
* The act of the defendant, as alleged in the complaint, -was such
as would have entitled the infant to maintain an action and re-
cover damages in respect thereof if death had not ensued. Death
having ensued, the right of action for wrongful death vested in
the administrator under the terms of the statute. We quote from
the decision in State, etc. v. Sherman, Md., 198 A. (2d) 71, 72, a
ease of parallel facts, which reached the Maryland court after
it had decided in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 79 A.
(2d) 550, that a child, after birth, could maintain an action
for prenatal injuries.
"We think the decision of this Court in Damasiewicz is
virtually controlling here. We there recognized that, at
least in the case of a viable child, such child had a cause of
action when born alive, arising out of prenatal injury due
to the negligent act of a third person. The cause of action
arose at the time of the injury and we see no more reason
'why it should be cut off because of the child's death before
birth, than if it died thereafter. The wrongful act would
1961:]
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have entitled the 'party injured to maintain an action * * * *
if death had not ensued,' and under the plain words of the
death statute we think the action survives, or permits the
parents to recover, notwithstanding the death of the child."
(Emphasis added.)
The Sherman case, supra, decided in March, 1964, is the most
recent of a number of cases in which the courts of nine states
have followed the landmark decision in Verkennes v. Corniea,
229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. (2d) 838, 10 A.L.R. (2d) 634, decided
in August, 1949, to the conclusion which we have indicated on
similar facts. During the same period, the courts of five states
held that these facts would not support an action for wrongful
death. In the most recent decision which has come to our atten-
tion, Gullborg v. Rizzo, 3 Cir., 331 F. (2d) 557, decided April
14, 1964, the United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit,
Pennsylvania law being applicable, decided that recovery may
be had for the wrongful death of a stillborn, viable fetus. We
adopt this view for the reasons already stated and refrain from
giving the citations, pro and con, because all of them are set
forth in State, etc. v. Sherman, supra, 198 A. (2d) 71 and in
Gullborg v. Rizzo, supra, 331 F. (2d) 557.
The challenge to plaintiff's capacity to sue is upon the ground
that the appointment of an administrator was not justified. The
argument is that in the absence of a live birth "no rights vested,
supporting either a cause of action, or the appointment of an
administrator." Consistently with our conclusion that the com-
plaint states a cause of action, the exception raising this ques-
tion is overruled.
Affirmed.
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ROBERT McC. FIGG*
Since 1946, according to Dean Prosser, "a series of more than
thirty cases, many of them expressly overruling prior holdings,
have brought about the most spectacular abrupt reversal of a
well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts."1
This "well settled rule" was recognized and stated by the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina in West v. MeCoy2 as follows:
An expectant mother sustaining personal injuries as a
result of which her child is born dead has no cause of action
for the death of the child, the child not being regarded as
a person until born alive. * * * Under common law the
child had no right to recover damages for prenatal injuries
and the parents had no right to recover damages either be-
fore or after birth; therefore, if the right to recover money
by way of damages exists, it exists perforce by way of
Statute.3
The court held that an action for alleged wrongful death
would not lie in the case of an unborn baby whose mother suffer-
ed a tortiously caused miscarriage after 5 months pregnancy.
It did not appear, observed the court, that the child was viable
at the time of injury or delivery, and the question "whether an
action may be maintained by a child injured while En Ventre
Sa Mire and born alive" was expressly reserved. The court
stated: "The policy considerations which call for a right of
action when a child survives do not necessarily apply in the
absence of survival.")
4
The question thus reserved, "whether a child who, while viable
and capable of existing independenly of its mother, suffers a
prenatal injury through the alleged negligence of another, may
after its birth maintain a cause of action against such other for
damages on account of the injury sustained," was decided in
Hall v. Murphy.5
Reviewing the cases which denied recovery for prenatal in-
juries, noting the later trend away therefrom, and listing many
of the cases following such trend, the court said that it had "no
* Dean of the School of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. PROSSER, TORTS 355-56 (3rd ed. 1964).
2. 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
3. Id. at 374, 105 S.E.2d at 90 (1958).
4. Id. at 375, 105 S.E.2d at 91 (1958).
5. 236 S.C. 257, 259, 113 S.E.2d 790, 791 (1960).
443
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difficulty in concluding that a foetus having reached that period
of prenatal maturity where it is capable of independent life
apart from its mother is a person and if such a child is injured,
it may after birth maintain an action for such injuries."6 It
limited the decision to "liability for prenatal injuries to a viable
child born alive."
In Fowler v. Woodward7 the complaint alleged that a child,
in the eighth month of gestation, perished with its mother in an
automobile collision and ensuing fire. Citing Hall v. Murphy as
plenary authority that a viable foetus is a person which after
birth may maintain an action for prenatal injuries, the court
held that its death before birth from prenatal injury came with-
in the provisions of the wrongful death statute,8 as being the
death of a person entitled to maintain an action if death had
not ensued. The court added that it had "no difficulty in hold-
ing that a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child
arises immediately upon the infliction of the injury." 9
Almost on the same day as the filing of the opinion in Fowler
v. Woodward, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
Judge Haynsworth dissenting, reached the same conclusion as to
the South Carolina law,10 and reversed the district court which
had held that the death of an unborn child, though viable,
would not sustain a cause of action under the wrongful death
statute. The dissent forcefully contended that the child's action
for prenatal injury should depend upon live birth, not viability,
and expressed the view that such a condition to recovery would
best serve the relevant "social and legal considerations which
lie upon either side of the problem." The majority opinion
relied upon Hall v. Murphy as according to the viable foetus
the status of a person in esse, and held that logic would then
constitute its wrongful death a cause of action under the wrong-
ful death statute. The court said that a rule fixing survival as
the determinant, rather than viability, would have the appeal
of simplicity, which, however, might "aid the judiciary but
hardly justice," and that while additional word from the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina would have been a welcome
guide, "we believe we are pursuing its policy." Fowler v. Wood-
ward evidenced that they were.
6. Id. at 263, 113 S.E.2d at 793.
7. 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964).
8. S.C. CoDE §§ 10-1951 thru 10-1956 (1962).
9. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964).
10. Todd v. Sandridge Constr. Co. .. F2d. (1964).
[Vol. 16
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While one may be permitted to wonder whether Lord Camp-
bell, and the many legislators who adopted his legislation,
would recognize and welcome the prenatal additions to the
content of the word "person" as used by them, or whether the
employment of the wrongful death statute to confer by in-
direction benefits upon the parent or parents of a stillborn child
denied to them by the courts in direct actions having at least
equal appeal in justice, no one who believes in "a system of law
wherein liability is adjusted to the ends which law should
serve"'" can do other than applaud the holding that the common
law should and can afford relief to one condemned by tortious
prenatal injury to the life of a cripple, or a blind or a deformed
person.
What the courts have been doing in the prenatal injury field
is strikingly articulated by the Court of Appeals of New York
in Woods v. Lancet,12 in which the court, overruling an earlier
decision, held that an infant, born permanently maimed and
disabled by injuries received while in his mother's womb during
the ninth month of her pregnancy, was entitled to maintain a
cause of action for damages for such injuries. Woods v. Lancet
was referred to (somewhat more than in passing) in each of the
South Carolina prenatal injury cases.
After an extensive review of the prior law, the court said:
Negligence law is common law, and the common law has
been molded and changed and brought up-to-date in many
another case. Our court said, long ago, that it had not
only the right, but the duty to re-examine a question where
justice demands it. * * *
The sum of the argument against plaintiff here is that
there is no New York decision in which such a claim has
been enforced. Winfield's answer to that, (see U. of Toronto
L. J. article, supra, p. 29) will serve: "if that were a valid
objection, the common law would now be what it was in
the Plantagenet period." * * * We act in the finest common
law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to
produce common-sense justice. * * *
Legislative action there could, of course, be, but we abdi-
cate our own function, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory,
11. CARDozo, THE GRoWTH OF THE LAW, 101 (1924).
12. 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 27 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1951).
1964]
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when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfactory
court-made rule.13
Although the South Carolina court had no difficulty "in
adapting and adjusting decisional law" to afford a remedy for
prenatal injuries, a majority of the court, in Page v. Winter,
14
declared a similar function to be beyond its power in considering
whether a wife may recover for loss of consortium resulting from
personal injuries to her husband tortiously inflicted, although
the unity concept of the common law has been altered by
Statute. 1
After stating that recovery by the wife for loss of consortium
resulting from negligent misconduct of a third person was not
permitted at common law, the majority opinion said:
It is not for this court to repudiate the common law rule
because we may think it illogical or undesirable. We do
not have the right "to repeal, alter, modify, or change the
law of the land, even when it plainly appears that the law
in force may be wrong." O'Hagan v. Fraternal Aid Union,
144 S.C. 84, 141 S.E. 893, 57 A.L.R. 397.16
The court stated that, without legislative action, "we must be
governed by the policy of the common law," and buttressed its
conclusion with the following quotation:
"It is often the function of the courts by their judgments
to establish public policy where none on the subject exists.
But overthrow by the courts of existing public policy is
quite another matter. That its establishment may have re-
sulted from decisional, rather than statutory, law, is in our
opinion, immaterial. Once firmly rooted, such policy be-
comes in effect a rule of conduct or of property within the
State. In the exercise of proper judicial self-restraint, the
courts should leave it to the people, through their elected
representatives in the General Assembly, to say whether
or not it should be revised or discarded." Rogers v. Florence
Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258.17
In TVoods v. Lancet, the court, as to prenatal injuries, replied
to this view thus:
13. Id. at 354-55, 102 N.E.2d at 694.
14. 240 S.C. 516, 126 S.E.2d 570 (1962).
15. Cf. PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 903, 916 et seq.
16. Page v. Winter, 240 S.C. 516, 518, 126 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1962).
17. Id. at 518-19, 126 S.E.2d at 572.
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Of course, rules of law on which men rely in their busi-
ness dealings should not be changed in the middle of the
game, but what has that to do with bringing to justice a
tort-feasor who surely has no moral or other right to rely
on a decision of the New York Court of Appeals?' 8
In a field as nonstatutory as that of tort liability, do tort
feasors gain vested interests in Stare decisis? Must the judicial
branch of the government, having acted, look to the legislature
to alter its precedents, which it may come to view as unfortunate
or unjust? Do not the Justices of the Supreme Court of South
Carolina, like the Judges of the Court of Appeals of New York,
sit as successors of common law judges, and "act in the finest
common-law tradition" in adapting and altering decisional law
"to produce commonsense justice"?
The cases of State v. Sellers'9 and State v. Charleston Bridge
Company,20 which are cited for support in O'Ilagan v. Fraternal
Aid Union, supra, do not warrant or require a negative answer.
In State v. Sellers the court referred to the common law as a
"system of jurisprudence" which "obtains in this state until
it is altered, modified, or repealed by enactment of the law-
making body. 21 It did not doubt, or even refer to, the power
of the judges to alter judge-made common law.
In State v. Charleston Bridge Company the question was
whether the common law was of force in this state, the 1712
statute whereby the common law was first adopted not having
been included in the 1912 Code of Laws. After stating that such
statute was merely declaratory in its nature, the court held:
In the case of Shecut v. McDowel, 1 Tread. Const. 35, the
principle is thus correctly stated by Nott, J.:
"The first question * * * is whether * * * this Court is
to be governed by the principles of the common law, as
settled in England. * * * As to the first point, our act of
Assembly, passed in the year 1712, says the common law
of England shall be in as full force and virtue in this State
as in England. And, even if it did not, I do not know by
what other law we should be governed; for the common
18. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694, 27 A.L.R.2d
1250 (1951).
19. 140 S.C. 66, 134 S.E. 873 (1926).
20. 113 S.C. 116, 101 S.E. 657 (1919).
21. 140 S.C. 66, 73, 134 S.E. 873, 875 (1926).
1964]
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law is as much the law of this country as of England. I do
not mean to say that we are bound by every decision made by
the Courts of England. We have a right to take our own
view of the common law.
' 22
22. 113 S.C. 116, 126, 101 S.E. 657, 660 (1919).
[Vol. 16
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In essence, the decision in Fowler 'v. Woodward is an exten-
sion of the rule established in lall v. Murphy' in which recovery
of damages for wrongful death was conditioned on the child
being born alive. The Fowler case eliminates this condition and
now the test is the viability of the child at the time of the injury.
Interestingly, this question was also presented to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Todd v. Sandidge Construction Co.,
2
a case arising from South Carolina, and this court in a two to
one decision arrived at the same conclusion later reached by the
South Carolina Supreme Court in Fowler. The majority opinion
of the Court of Appeals reversed the district judge's action in
dismissing the complaint. Judge Martin, in the district court,
based his decision in particular on West V. McCoy 3 where our
supreme court had ruled that while policy considerations favored
a right of action where the child survived, that these consider-
ations "do not necessarily apply in the absence of survival." In
a trenchant dissent, Judge Clement I-aynesworth of South Caro-
lina reviewed prior South Carolina law and concluded that the
case law of South Carolina pointed to no recovery unless there
was live birth.
The rationale of the Fowler case apparently is in holding that
the viable fetus is a "person" within the contemplation of our
Wrongful Death Statute. In so holding, South Carolina has
now aligned itself with Connecticut, 4 Kentucky," Iowa,G New
Hampshire,7 Mississippi, 8 Minnesota,9 and Ohio10 where the
following interesting question was posed:
Suppose viable unborn twins suffered simultaneously the
same prenatal injury of which one died before and the other
after birth. Shall there be a cause of action for the death of
one and not for the death of the other? Surely logic requires
* Attorney at Law, Charleston, South Carolina.
1. 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
2. - F.2d_ (4th Circ. 1964).
3. 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
4. Gorke v. LeClerc, 181 A.2d 448 (1962).
5. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901 (1955).
6. Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
7. Poliquin v. McDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957).
8. Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954).
9. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
10. Stidam v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E.2d 106 (1959).
449
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recognition of causes of action for the death of both, or for
neither.
fRecently, Maryland has also followed suit.11
The opposite point of view, which rejects the viability test
but insists on live birth as the starting point is reflected in the
decisions of the supreme court of Massachusetts, 12 Illinois,
13
New York,14 and Tennessee.15
Another line of cases apparently reject both the born alive
test and the viability test.10
The late Pennsylvania case of Carroll v. Skloff,
7 decided
July 1, 1964, is interesting in that the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to be "second guessed" by the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Gullborg v. Rizzo' 8 which held that the Pennsyl-
vania Wrongful Death Statute permitted recovery by parents
of a still-born child. The Carroll case held, however, that there
is no right of recovery under the state's Wrongful Death Act
and Survival Statute by the administrator of an estate on behalf
of an infant aborted, en ventre sa mere, as the result of a direct
trauma.
Until Foul'er, the courts of other jurisdictions had placed
South Carolina in the column of states which predicated re-
covery on the condition that the child must be born alive.19
The Massachusetts Court says: "Recent decisions against re-
covery are found in ... West v. McCoy, 1958, 233 S.C. 369, 105
S.E.2d 88 .... " In the case of Mace v. Jung the District Court
of Alaska says: "The more recent decisions indicative of the
'more liberal and realistic approach to the problem,' urged by
plaintiff, support the view that a viable unborn child may, after
birth maintain an action for such injuries. 20 The Alaska court
cited West v. McCoy and Hall v. Murphy.
11. State v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (1964).
12. Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960).
13. Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).
14. Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691, 27 A.L.R.2d 1250 (1951).
15. Shousha v. Matthews Drivurself Service, Inc., 358 S.W.2d 471 (1962).
Hogan v. McDaniel, 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958).
16. Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). Howell
v. Rushing, 261 P2d 217 (Okla. 1953). Norman v. Murphy, 268 P.2d 178
(Calif. 1954). Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901). Magnolia
Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935).
17. _. Pa. 202 A.2d 9 (1964).
18. 331 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir. 1964).
19. See, Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912,
914, (1960) (dictum) ; Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706, 707 (D.C. Alaska 1962)
(dictum).
20. 210 F. Supp. at 707.
[Vol. 16
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If there is any criticism of the viability test announced by the
court in Fowler, it seems that there would be two logical grounds
of attack. One is that an unborn child is not a person within
the contemplation of the Wrongful Death Statute and hence
not entitled to recovery. Our court has attempted to answer
this argument by quoting certain language from Hall v. Murphy.
It is further interesting to note, however, that when this exact
question was presented to the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Hogan 'v. McDaniel,21 that court, in interpreting the very similar
Tennessee Wrongful Death Statute22 concluded that a viable
child en ventre sa mere was not a "person", the basis of the
court's conclusion being that the Tennessee legislature did not
intend to declare that an unborn child is a "person" within
the contemplation of Tennessee's Wrongful Death Statute.
The other criticism of the viability test is a practical one.
Where do you draw the line? Live birth is a logical starting
point. Whether an unborn child is "quick", however, (with no
recovery under West) or "viable" (with recovery under Fowler)
can be an intriguing subject for medical experts. Thus another
appellant (or respondent) can argue that there is really no
logical distinction between the last stages of "quickness" and
the first stages of "viability". In effect, therefore, has not the
Fowler case drastically limited the doctrine of Vest v. McCoy,
and in particular the following statement: "The policy consider-
ations which call for a right of action when a child survives do
not necessarily apply in the absence of survival"?
21. Supra, Note 15.
22. TEN.N. COD ANmN. § 20-607 (1955).
1964]
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FRANK L. TAYLOR*
In Fowler v. Wfoodward the South Carolina Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether an administrator may
be appointed and may bring an action under our wrongful
death act 1 to recover damages for the prenatal destruction of
a viable fetus. In other words, plaintiff's (administrator's)
intestate was a viable fetus born dead by reason of prenatal
injuries inflicted by defendant's negligent and willful conduct.
In the interest of painting just a little background (no effort
will be made to trace the development of the law on the prob-
lems involved in the case under study, since the opinions in
the three South Carolina cases mentioned herein do that quite
well), it is interesting to note the South Carolina Supreme
Court's 1958 decision in Vest v. McCoy.2 In that case the court
said: "In the instant case, we are not concerned with death after
birth, neither does it appear that the child was viable at the
time of injury or delivery. . . ," and also: "We are, therefore,
not concerned here with whether an action may be maintained
by a child injured while En Ventre Sa Mere and born alive,
and intimate no opinion thereabout. . ."3 After stating the prob-
lem to be one of a non-viable fetus at the time of injury which
was stillborn, the court gave its answer in these words: "Under
the facts as heretofore stated, we are of opinion that an action
will not lie under Section 10-1951, Code of Laws of South
Carolina, 1952, that the Order should be reversed and the de-
murrer sustained. .. "
The painting of the next section of the background involves
the opinion in Hall v. Murphty,5 decided in 1960, which disposed
of two cases then pending before the court. In this opinion the
supreme court stated the problem as follows: "So the decisive
question in each of these cases is whether a child who, while viable
and capable of existing independently of its mother, suffers a
prenatal injury through the alleged negligence of another, may
after its birth maintain a cause of action against such other for
damages on account of injury sustained."8 After thusly stating
* Attorney at Law, Columbia, South Carolina.
1. S.C. COD § 10-1951 thru 10-1956 (1962).
2. 233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958).
3. Id. at 375, 105 S.E.2d at 90-91.
4. Id. at 377, 105 S.E.2d at 91.
5. 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
6. Id. at 259, 113 S.E.2d at 791.
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the problem, the court said by way of answer: "We think the
reasons assigned by the courts for holding that a child after
birth may not maintain an action for prenatal injuries are un-
sound, illogical and unjust,"17 and also: "We have no difficulty
in concluding that a foetus having reached that period of pre-
natal maturity where it is capable of independent life apart from
its mother is a person and if such a child is injured, it may
after birth maintain an action for such injuries."8 Refusing to
concern itself with questions not presented by the facts of the
cases then before it, the court stated: "Our decision is limited
to liability for prenatal injuries to a viable child born alive."9
Against this background, then, in 1964, the supreme court of
this state was presented in Fowler with the problem of the
viable fetus which is allegedly destroyed by prenatal injuries
and, therefore, is stillborn.
Incidentally, it would appear that there is one further varia-
tion which can arise. We are dealing with an "equation" in
which there are two variable factors. Consequently, there are
four possible variations:
(1) non-viable fetus at the time of injury PLUS stillbirth
EQUALS no action allowed in the West case;
(2) viable fetus at the time of injury PLUS live birth
EQUALS action allowed in the Hall case;
(3) viable fetus at the time of injury PLUS stillbirth
EQUALS action allowed in the Fowler case; and
(4) non-viable fetus at the time of injury PLUS live birth
EQUALS question yet to be answered by our supreme court.10
The late Chief Justice Stukes (then Justice) said, in Ballenger
v. Southern Worsted Corp.:" "Legal proximate cause is de-
termined upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense and
experience, policy, and precedent." One wonders if Justice Stukes
did not, perhaps unintentionally, provide a definition for "the
law" in explaining one of its component parts. In the judgment
of the writer, these same considerations should govern the develop-
7. Id. at 262, 113 S.E.2d at 793.
8. Id. at 263, 113 S.E.2d at 793.
9. Ibid.
10. See Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipeline Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727
(1956) for a case allowing recovery in such a situation.
11. 209 S.C. 463, 466, 40 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1946).
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ment of the law as a whole and should be the basic determining
guidelines when the fourth varient of the problem-injury to a
non-viable fetus subsequently born alive-is presented to the
court.
The inevitability of the decision in Fowler, after the court held
as it did in Hall, was clear. In the language of Justice Brails-
ford in Fowler: "Once the concept of the unborn, viable child
as a person is accepted, we have no difficulty in holding that
a cause of action for tortious injury to such a child arises im-
mediately upon the infliction of the injury"' 2 (without regard
to whether or not the child's life is then and there terminated).
[Emphasis added]
The rationale of Fowler, and its foundation, Hail, is unim-
peachable. That (i.e., a fetus) which is alive and capable of an
existence independent of any other living person (i.e., the
mother) is a person-if not, what else? A person has rights
under our laws among which we must number the right to be
free from harm by the tortious conduct of others. To say other-
wise would be saying that one who lives temporarily in the
house of another, rather than in his own house, is not a private
citizen and has no private rights. For every right there is a
correlative duty. The violation of these rights will give rise to
an action to recover damages-either an action by or on behalf
of the person himself or an action by those who, by their relation
to the injured person, are damaged by his injury. "All Courts
shall be public, and every person shall have speedy remedy
therein for wrongs sustained."'
3
It would be a sad commentary on the law if a defendant who
had negligently and willfully injured a person (i.e., a viable
fetus) could avoid liability under the Wrongful Death Act by
saying: "The person I injured died." The proper answer to
this is: "Yes, he did-that is why you are being sued and should
be sued." Such an argument on the part of a defendant puts
one in mind of the story of the young man who killed both of
his parents and, at his trial, threw himself on the mercy of the
court on the ground that he was an orphan.
Although the opinion itself does not mention this fact, a study
of the briefs in Fowler reveals that the plaintiff (administrator)
was the only statutory beneficiary. His wife was killed in the
12. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964).
13. S.C. CoxsT. art. I, § 15 (1895).
(Vol. 16
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same collision that resulted in the death of the child (i.e., the
viable fetus), and he had no other children. The damages sus-
tained by the beneficiary through the wrongful death of the
plaintiff's intestate are obvious. Sometimes hard cases make
good law.
In any event, as Justice Brailsford pointed out: "It is beside
the point that the extent of damages might be difficult, or even
impossible, to establish prior to birth...; this would not affect
the existence of the cause of action. .... ,14 I am sure that plain-
tiff's attorneys all over the country appreciate the solicitude
of those defendant's counsel who have argued the difficulty of
plaintiffs proving damages when they contested the existence
of a cause of action in cases like Hall and Fowler. How gracious
of them to want to spare us the arduous task of proving dam-
ages in a case where we, who bear the burden under the law,
would find it difficult-with friends like these, plaintiffs at-
torneys need no enemies. However, as Justice Brailsford said,
this is "beside the point."
It is the opinion of the writer that the decision of the court
in Hall and Fowler will be conducive to just and equitable re-
sults. It should never be forgotten that the imposition of lia-
bility is one of the sure deterents to tortious conduct. But more
important-aside from considerations of the promotion of the
best interests of society as a whole-if in a given situation an
individual can prove damages, there should be a cause of action
by which he can recover. If damages are not provable by
accepted standards to the satisfaction of a jury, the prospective
defendants have no cause for concern. There are, of course,
situations which are, and should be, damnum absgue iizjuria.
However, in those situations there are overriding considerations
which compel the conclusion that no actionable wrong exists
even though damage has resulted, e.g., sovereign immunity. But
no such overriding considerations in favor of an ordinary tort-
feasor exist where he has inflicted injury upon a viable fetus
by his tortious conduct.
Of course, the court has already answered in West the question
of "action or no action" on account of injury to a non-viable
fetus which is stillborn. The writer will not address himself
to whether or not he agrees with that decision. Applying to
that decision the criterion which may be distilled from the brew
14. Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E2d 42, 44 (S.C. 1964).
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of "mixed considerations of logic, common sense and experience,
policy, and precedent," there are certain things which may be
said in its favor. The decision holds "no action" only under
circumstances where: (a) there never was, and never will be,
"a person" as that term is used in Hall and Fowler; (b) it prob-
ably would be impossible to prove that an embryo would have
become viable but for the injury (especially so if the injury
occurs in the early stages of pregnancy) ; and (c) where no child
is born malformed and afflicted for life. In spite of Justice
Brailsford's language in Fowler to the effect that neither diffi-
culty nor impossibility of proving damages should bear on the
question of whether a cause of action exists, perhaps difficulty of
proof is one thing and impossibility of proof is another. For, if
we are talking about the impossibility of proving damages, the
law should never require anyone to do a useless thing-such as
defend against an action in which one essential element could
not possibly be proven by the plaintiff.
It is interesting to speculate on how the court will hold when
presented with a case involving injuries to a non-viable fetus
later born alive and disabled for life. Will the court feel that
the question of whether the plaintiff was "a person" at the time
of the injury is the pivotal one? We are, of course, talking now
about a case where the embryo is injured but later becomes
viable and is born alive and brings its own lawsuit, albeit by a
guardian ad litem, i.e., where he is a "person" at the time of
suit.
The closest analogy which occurs to the writer is the situation
where a defendant causes injury to a piece of property during
the ownership of the plaintiff's predecessor in title, and the
property later passes into the ownership of the plaintiff, who
brings an action to recover for the damages. In this situation,
the plaintiff does not have standing to recover for the earlier
injury to the property; instead, the plaintiff's predecessor in
title must bring an action to recover, for the injury was an of-
fense to his ownership and not the later ownership of the plain-
tiff. Actually, however, this is not a good analogy. On the one
hand, the plaintiff must live with the damage (just as the in-
jured non-viable fetus which is later born alive but disabled must
live with his disability). On the other hand, the analogy breaks
down, in that in the property situation the wrongdoer must
answer to someone-the plaintiff's predecessor in title. In the
other situation there is no predecessor in title to the misshapen
[Vol. 16
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body of the disabled child, so the defendant goes free from
the consequences of his wrong. Furthermore, a plaintiff in a
property situation has a choice of buying or refusing to buy the
damaged property; our disabled child has no choice in the
matter.
As stated above, it is interesting to speculate how the court
will hold if and when this last situation is presented for decision
in an actual case. Should the writer be involved in the case, he
would choose to be "Attorney for the Plaintiff."
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GE ORGE D. HAIMBAUGH, JR.*
The recognition for the first time by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, in Fowler v. Woodward, of the right to recover
for the wrongful death of an unborn, viable infant raises the
question of the definition of an appropriate measure of damages
in such a case.
In a search for answers to the question, Hall v. Murphy,' a
case with strong analogies to Fowler, may serve as a point of
departure. The actions in Hall included one for a wrongful
death which was alleged to have resulted some four hours after
birth from a prenatal injury to a viable child. Judge Grimball's
charge to the jury included the following:
I charge you, Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, that you may
award such damages as you find the plaintiff is entitled to
recover in this action as you may think proportioned to the
injuries resulting from such death of the plaintiff's intestate,
and that the elements of damage in this action for wrong-
ful death include pecuniary loss, mental pain and suffering,
wounded feelings, grief and sorrow, loss of companionship
and deprivation of the use and comfort of the intestate's
society.
I charge you that where the law presumes a pecuniary
loss to the beneficiary, substantial damages may be recovered
without proof of any special pecuniary loss...
Mr. Foreman and gentlemen, the plaintiff would not
be entitled to conjectural or speculative damages in any
event but if you find that the plaintiff is entitled to a ver-
dict for actual damages, it should include such future or
prospective damages, if any, as the evidence renders it
reasonably certain will of necessity result in the future for
the alleged wrongful death of the intestate. Such future or
prospective damages, if any, must be reduced to their present
cash value. Now the burden rests upon the plaintiff to
establish the amount of his damages by preponderance of
the evidence.
This does not mean the plaintiff must prove the same to a
mathematical certainty or that plaintiff must adduce evi-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law.
1. In this case the trial judge's orders overruling demurrers in actions for
wrongful death and for pain and suffering by the infant during its four hours
of life were affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Hall v. Murphy,
236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E.2d 790 (1960).
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dence as to the precise amount therefor. It does mean that
the evidence adduced by the plaintiff must be such as to
enable the jury to determine what amount is fair and just
and reasonable.2
Loss of support less cost of upbringing without compensation
for the grief of the parents was the damage formula of an earlier
agrarian era in actions for wrongful death of a child.3 The
elements of damage listed by Judge Grimball typify the at-
tempt of modern courts to justify substantial damages to bereft
parents in a day when the cost of raising children is greater
and their opportunity to earn is less. In Hall, the jurymen had
no occasion to dispose of the plaintiff's request for $100,000 in
the light of the charge as they returned a verdict for the defend-
ant. Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,4 another wrongful
death case in which the parents of a 12 year old boy were
awarded $50,000 actual and $15,000 punitive damages by a jury
operating under a damage charge similar5 to that in Hall, may
be useful in a consideration of whether or to what extent the
elements of damage enumerated in Hall and Mock are appro-
priate in a case like Fowler.
Essentially, the repetitions of the modern formula for damages
in wrongful death actions may be resolved into two elements:
the parents' grief and their pecuniary loss of the child's potential
earnings. Large recoveries6 have been approved without evidence
as to actual earnings and on the basis of such "imponderables
as mental anguish, grief and loss of companionship."
2. The charge to the jury by Judge John Grimball in the case of Hall v.
Murphy in the Court of Common Pleas of Anderson County, South Carolina.
3. See opinion of Judge Holtzoff in Hord v. National Homeopathic Hospital,
102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952).
4. 227 S.C. 245, 87 S.E.2d 830 (1955).
5. In the case of Mock v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. in the Common Pleas
Court of Charleston County, Judge Steve C. Griffith's charge to the jury in-
cluded the following: "The plaintiff alleges as damages that they have suffered
pecuniary loss; mental shock; and suffering; wounded feelings; grief and
sorrow; loss of his love companionship; and have been deprived of the use and
comfort and the society of the deceased, in addition to his ability to earn money
to assist in the support, maintenance and care of his parents; all to their
damage. Now I charge you that all of those elements are proper elements of
damage in a case of this kind. And if the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you
will consider all of such elements as may be established by the evidence and
the greater weight thereof." 395 Supreme Court of South Carolina: Cases
Heard and Submitted, November Term 1953, record of the Mock case, Pg. 431.
6. In recent South Carolina cases parents have recovered $30,000 actual and
$5,000 punitive damages each for the deaths of two daughters, aged 18 and 13,
Smith v. Hardy, 228 S.C. 112, 88 S.E.2d 865, (1955) ; and $30,000 damages for
the death of a 4 year old child, Hicklin v. Jeff Hunt Machinery Co., 226 S.C.
484, 85 S.E.2d 739, (1955).
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The South Carolina Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the
trial court's decision in favor of the plaintiff in Mock, but Chief
Justice Baker, with Justice Stukes concurring, dissented with
regard to the amount of the verdict. "The verdict," he objected,
"is, in my opinion, wholly disproportionate to the measurable
damages sustained, and it is the duty of this court to set it aside."
Noting that it did not appear "that [young Mlock] had any
earning capacity or that he had ever done work for financial
gain," the Chief Justice concluded that it could not "be assumed
that [the parents] suffered any pecuniary loss in his passing."
7
The majority of the court, however, were unwilling to join in
striking this element of damage, apparently viewing the testi-
mony "that the deceased was a lad twelve years old, healthy,
of good habits, of sound mind and ability, [and] a fifth grade
student" as possible evidence of future earning capacity. Such
evidence as to the actual industry or prodigality of unborn
decedents, however, would be unavailable; and, therefore, any
assumption as to earning power much more speculative than in
Mock.
The willingness of the court to make assumptions with regard
to the parent-child relationship is exemplified in Mock where
the supreme court "assumed that [the deceased child] was held
in loving esteem by his parents and that they experienced the
natural feelings of grief in the loss of a loving son."" Such
evidence as to the actual industry or prodigality of unborn
decedents would be unavailable and, therefore, any assumption
as to earning power more nearly speculative than in Mock. But,
in a case like Fowler, not even this type of evidence would be
available, and it is difficult to see how assumptions as to the
parent-child relationship could be other than conjectural.
The greater seriousness of the wrongful death of a child or
adult as compared to the wrongful death of an unborn, viable
infant, may be suggested by analogy with the penal law. In
South Carolina, for example, the penalty for murder is death
or, if mercy is recommended by the jury, life imprisonment at
hard labor.9 The penalty for abortion, however, is a fine of
$1,000 and/or not more than two years confinement for the
7. 227 S.C. 245, 267.
8. Chief Justice Baker reduces the elements of damage in Mock to "such
mental shock and suffering, wounded feelings, grief and sorrow, loss of com-
panionship and deprivation of the use and comfort of intestate's society as the
beneficiaries may have sustained as the result of the death of the intestate."
9. S.C. CoDE § 16-52 (1962).
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mother'0 and from five to twenty years imprisonment for any-
one, other than the mother, found guilty in such a case.'1 And
although there is no statute of limitation in the case of murder,
there is a two year statute in the case of abortion. 12
If a jury in Fowler should find for the plaintiff, it would be
faced with the decision of whether to award the $100,000 claimed
or indeed, any substantial sum. Such a determination would
require the jurymen to decide whether they could allow damages
for future earnings or parental grief without entering the for-
bidden realm of speculation and conjecture. If so, they would
then have to decide whether they could award a sum comparable
to those given in ordinary wrongful death actions without
ignoring the sense of the legislature as expressed in the criminal
code provisions concerning murder and abortion.
If the courts are to allow substantial damages to be awarded in
cases of wrongful death of unborn, viable infants, they might
include in the damage formula a more down-to-earth element-
an element for which a young lady in the class of Professor
Willard Pedrick at Northwestern suggested the term "cost of
reproduction !"
10. S.C. CODE § 16-84 (1962).
11. S.C. CODE § 16-82 (1962).
12. S.C. CODE § 16-86 (1962).
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